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ABSTRACT 
In Ostsee und Mittelmeer spielen Inseln eine wichtige Rolle bei der Umsetzung europäischer 
makroregionaler Strategien. Der Aufsatz untersucht, wie die EU an die Probleme von Inseln 
herangeht. Bis zu den Verträgen von Maastricht (1992) und Amsterdam (1997) wurden sie im 
Struktur- und regionalpolitischen Rahmen kaum beachtet. Seit die Insellage als gesondertes 
Problem anerkannt wird, bemisst die EU die „dauerhaften strukturellen Nachteile“ von Inseln 
fast ausschließlich an ihrer Entfernung vom nationalen Festland. Demgegenüber haben die 
Island Studies der letzten Jahrzehnte unter Verweis auf die die Vielseitigkeit der Außenverflech-
tung von Inseln eine stärker Insel- und Netzwerkzentrierte Sichtweise gefordert. Wie die Au-
torin unterstreicht, schmälert das Beharren der EU auf einem Festlandzentrierten Ansatz das 
Potential, das durch den stärkeren Ausbau von Inselnetzwerken zur Geltung gebracht werden 
könnte.
Since the introduction of a macro-regional strategy, the European Union has highlighted 
the need to link island areas better with the mainland in order to find a remedy to the 
“permanent structural handicaps”1 of islands. Declaration 30 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
states that island regions suffer from “structural handicaps linked to their island status.”2 
1 A. D. Foschi, X. Peraldi and M. Rombaldi, Inter-island links in Mediterranean Short Sea Shipping Networks, Dis-
cussion Paper 52 (2005), pp. 1-27, http://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2005-52.pdf (accessed 18 
January 2017).
2 European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts – Declarations adopted by the Conference – Declaration on 
Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 26 (2016) Heft 5, S. 14–28.
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The aim of my investigation is to focus on European views regarding the Mediterranean 
and Baltic Islands. The Baltic Sea region and the Mediterranean Arc provide two interest-
ing examples, as both represent a frontier zone the main feature of which is fluidity. This 
same fluidity characterizes the island world, confirming that the islands’ prevailing trait is 
connectivity rather than isolation. In this paper, I will discuss the European Union’s view 
of islands and the establishment of cooperation networks among them. My hypothesis 
is that the conceptual basis of the EU’s island policies failed to appreciate both the po-
tential and the challenges of connectivity, and insisted instead on educating the actors to 
behave according to traditional insularity schemes.
At first glance, islands appear to be isolated worlds by definition, that is, inward-looking 
and jealous of a cultural heritage that has stratified over time. Many of them have been 
frequently conquered, and represented a mirage for those who aspired to find a refuge 
or an idyllic place to establish experimental or utopian societies.3 Although they have on 
occasion played a leading role in history,4 island environments remained on the margins 
of historical reflection. It is only since the early 1990s, that island scholars inspired by 
the “spatial turn” in the social sciences have drawn attention to the need to shift the focus 
away from the continent.5 In particular Godfrey Baldacchino called “for a recentering 
of the emphasis from mainland to island, away from the discourse of conquest of main-
landers, giving a voice to and a platform for the expression of island narratives.”6 Island 
scholars have begun to focus on the claim that islands should be studied on their own 
terms, and some have labelled this interdisciplinary field of study “nissology”.
The idea of a new “island science” appeared for the first time in 1982 in Nissonologie 
ou Science des îles by the French sociologist Abraham André Moles.7 Ten years later, re-
searchers incorporated the concept into island studies,8 and it was then that nissologie9 or 
“nissology” emerged.10 In 1994, Grant McCall proposed the latter concept to provide a 
better understanding of insular spaces and to encourage international cooperation and 
networking among islands.11 One objective of nissology is to reverse the “continental 
island regions, in: Official Journal C 40, 10 November 1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=CELEX:11997D/AFI/DCL/0 (accessed 17 January 2017).
   See J.-C. Marimoutou and J.-M. Racault (eds.), L’insularité: thematique et representations, Paris 1995; M. Trabelsi 
(ed.), L’insularité, Clermont-Ferrand 2005.
  4 F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol. 1, Berkeley 1995, pp. 148-
160.
  5 See D. Paci, Spatial turn in history. La dimensione culturale e politica degli spazi insulari, in: M. Di Giacomo et al. 
(eds.), Piccole tessere di un grande mosaico. Nuove prospettive dei regional studies, Rome 2015, pp. 119-15.
  6 G. Baldacchino, Studying Islands: On Whose Terms? Some Epistemological and Methodological Challenges to 
the Pursuit of Island Studies, in: Island Studies Journal  (2008) 1, p. 7, http://www.islandstudies.ca/sites/island-
studies.ca/files/ISJ--1-2008-Baldacchino-FINAL.pdf (accessed 17 January 2017).
  7 A. A. Moles, Nissonologie ou sciences des îles, in: L’Espace géographique 11 (1982) 4, pp. 281-289.
  8 A. Vieira, The Islands: from Nissology to Nesology, in: Anuário do Centro de Estudos des História do Atlântico 2 
(2010), p. 25.
  9 C. Depraetere, Le phénomène insulaire à l‘échelle du globe: tailles, hiérarchies et formes des îles océanes, in: 
L’Espace Géographique 2 (1990–1991), pp. 126-4.
10 G. McCall, Nissology: a proposal for consideration, in: Journal of the Pacific Society 17 (1994) 2-, pp. 1-14.
11 Ibid., 2.
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bias” and (re)place the study of islands by treating them as interconnected units of a 
“world archipelago.”12 As already stated, in parallel with this renewed attention to island 
spaces in the human and social sciences, since the 1990s there has also been a growing 
interest of the EU in this spatial reality. Conceptually, however, the EU policies almost 
ignored nissology, preferring a more traditional understanding of island realities.
1. The Views of the European Union on the island question
In the 1950s, at the time of the birth of the European Economic Community, the inter-
est in island regions was virtually non-existent. The attention of the six-member Europe 
was exclusively addressed to the continent, as the CECA treaty of 1951 and the EEC 
treaty of 1957 prove. Although Italy only a few years earlier had granted autonomy status 
to its two major islands, Sicily and Sardinia, it showed no interest in raising the issue and 
claiming that the ECC should pay more attention to islands. In addition, Sicily and Sar-
dinia lacked the legal capacity to intervene because their statutes included no provisions 
relating to international agreements.13 The European Community only began to take 
into consideration the needs and requirements of islands in the course of the late 1980s, 
in a changing international context. During the two decades following the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, Europe’s geography was characterized by the emergence of an integrated supra-
national economic and political space. Also the islands were involved into the integration 
effort that went under the name of macro-regions.14 The European Union introduced 
a strategy based on these spatial entities with the intention of spreading the effects of 
economic development to the “periphery.”15
The conditions that created an environment favourable for the establishment of EU is-
land policies were on the one hand the upgrading of the regions to the position of active 
players on the European scene, which led to the creation of the Regional Committee in 
1992; on the other – in close connection with the development of the regional policy 
 – the granting of structural funds to “disadvantaged regions.”16 Following the creation of 
the European Fund for Regional Development (EFRD) in 1975 and the introduction of 
the notion of “disadvantaged area” in agricultural regulations, the European Community 
acknowledged the existence of disadvantaged territories, which included islands, and 
dedicated certain resources – although these were still modest at the time – to remedying 
12 C. Depraetere, The Challenge of Nissology. A Global Outlook on the World Archipelago. Part II: The Global and 
Scientific Vocation of Nissology, in: Island Studies Journal  (2008) 1, pp. 17-6, http://www.islandstudies.ca/
sites/islandstudies.ca/files/ISJ--1-2008-Depraetere2-FINAL_0.pdf (accessed 17 January 2017); on the concept 
of world archipelago, see also M. Shell, Islandology. Geography, Rhetoric, Politics, Stanford 2014, p. 21.
1 J.-D. Hache (ed.), Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, Paris 2000, p. 54.
14 See K. Mirwaldt, I. McMaster and J. Bachtler, The Concept of Macro-Regions: Practice and Prospects, Discussion 
Paper, Glasgow 2010, pp. 1-20, http://www.ostsam.no/file=18022 (accessed 17 January 2017).
15 N. Bellini and U. Hilpert (eds.), Europe’s Changing Geography: The Impact of Inter-regional Networks, New York 
201.
16 Hache, Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, p. 59.
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these disparities.17 The initiative by Greece proved to be decisive, because it enabled the 
island issue to be put on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference that prepared 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. France, Spain, and Portugal also coordinated a joint action in 
support of ultra-peripheral areas.18
The first reference to the social and economic constraints involving islands dates back 
to 1988, when, on the occasion of the Rhodes European Council, it was declared that 
“the European Council recognizes in particular the socio-economic problems of certain 
island regions in the Community. It therefore requests the Commission to examine these 
problems and submit, if appropriate, any proposals which it deems useful, within the 
financial possibilities offered by the Community’s existing policies as they have been 
decided.”19 In 1992, Article 129b of the Maastricht Treaty determined that “within the 
framework of a system of open and competitive markets, action by the Community shall 
aim at promoting the interconnection and inter-operability of national networks as well 
as access to such networks. It shall take into account in particular of the need to link 
island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions of the Community.”20 
It was however only in 1997 that the Amsterdam Treaty conceded that “island regions 
suffer from structural handicaps linked to their island status, the permanence of which 
impairs their economic and social development. The Conference accordingly acknowl-
edges that Community legislation must take account of these handicaps and that specific 
measures may be taken, where justified, in favour of these regions in order to integrate 
them better into the internal market on fair conditions.”21
The Amsterdam Treaty, which had the objective of lending support to sustainable devel-
opment, corrected the policies that Europe had hitherto adopted towards islands. Thanks 
to this Treaty, insular spaces are since then seen as experiencing pronounced ecological, 
social, and economic vulnerabilities.22 According to the European Commission, “institu-
tional recognition of the problem of the islands is important because it opens up the pos-
sibility of establishing new European programmes centring on the reduction of ‘perma-
nent structural handicaps’ and suggests that a special effort may be directed towards areas 
suffering from such structural handicaps linked to natural or geographic factors.”23
The Treaty of Amsterdam confirmed that the perception of islands was changing, in 
the sense that they had become a “problem” which the EU intended to deal with on 
the supranational level: “the approach to islands can no longer rely on compliance with 
17 Ibid., 57.
18 Ibid., 60.
19 European Council, Rhodes, 2 and  December, in: Bulletin of the European Communities 12 (1988), p. 10, http://
aei.pitt.edu/148/1/rhodes_june_1988.pdf (accessed 17 January 2017).
20 Council of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg 1992, p. 51, https://europa.
eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf (accessed 17 January 
2017).
21 European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam.
22 E. Stratford, Islandness and struggles over development: A Tasmanian case study, in: Political Geography 27 
(2008), pp. 160-175.
2 Foschi, Peraldi and Rombaldi, Inter-island links, p. 5.
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domestic laws, which are the result of historic heritages; it must also be based on an ac-
ceptance of geographical evidence and of its socio-economic effect on islands.”24 Article 
158 of the Amsterdam Treaty on cohesion policy refers directly to the necessity to reduce 
the “backwardness of the less favoured regions,” which include islands.25 As noted in 
Article 158 as well as in the 2002 publication “Off the Coasts of Europe” by the Confer-
ence of Peripheral and Maritime Regions, European islands are considered to be areas of 
“backwardness” within the EU policy community.
According to the European Union, there are certain characteristics that are common 
to islands and which can affect the conditions for their development. These character-
istics usually relate to their degree of “peripherality,” which is associated with physical 
parameters such as insularity. As the European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
(ESPON) admitted in 2011, this was the main reason why the characteristics of islands 
have usually been identified by use of the term “insularity” rather than “islandness,”26 
which is the notion preferred by recent scholarship in order to overcome the stereotypes 
of geographic isolation.27
Instead, the EU preferred “insularity” along with the formal definition by EUROSTAT, 
according to which an island is a piece of land with a surface area of at least one square 
kilometre, which is permanently inhabited by a statistically significant population (>50 
inhabitants), not linked to the mainland by permanent structures, separated from the 
mainland by a stretch of water at least one kilometre wide, and does not host any state’s 
capital city.28 As François Taglioni observes, the attempt to objectify islands by using 
similar parameters is in fact an illustration of the arbitrary nature of the methodology 
employed.29 One should note, for example, that this definition not only excludes island 
states from being considered to be islands,30 it also implies that with “mainland” only the 
national reference territory is contemplated. The formal definition adopted by the EU 
seemed therefore not even to fully satisfy their own requirements of supranational and 
interregional governance.
This said, the EU has become an important source of funding for regions through its 
Structural Funds, and it has made special provisions for islands in its Treaty. The Union 
24 Hache, Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, p. 61.
25 Foschi, Peraldi and Rombaldi, Inter-island links, p. 5.
26 ESPON, The Development of the Islands – European Islands and Cohesion Policy (EUROISLANDS), Luxembourg 
201, p. 9, http://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/Projects/TargetedAnalyses/EUROISLANDS/
FinalReport_foreword_CU-16-11-2011.pdf (accessed 17 January 2017).
27 E. Hepburn, Recrafting Sovereignty: Lessons from Small Island Autonomies?, in: A.-G. Gagnon and M. Keating, 
Political Autonomy and Divided Societies. Imagining Democratic Alternatives in Complex Settings, Basingstoke 
2012, p. 126.
28 C. Panou et al., Universal service obligations in insular areas, Lyon 2007, p. 6.
29 F. Taglioni, Insularity, Political Status and small insular spaces, in: Shima: The International Journal of Research 
into Island Cultures 5 (2011) 2, p. 48, https://hal-univ-diderot.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-0068605/document (ac-
cessed 17 January 2017).
0 S. Moncada et al., Islands at the Periphery: Integrating the Challenges of Island Sustainability into European 
Policy, in: European Documentation and Research Centre (ed.), Malta in the European Union: Five years on 
and looking to the Future, Msida 2009, p. 58, https://www.mepa.org.mt/file.aspx?f=2887 (accessed 17 January 
2017).
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distinguishes among three categories of islands: 1) islands that are part of “overseas coun-
tries and territories” (such as Greenland, French Polynesia, and Bermuda); 2) the “most 
remote regions”, consisting of the French Overseas Departments, the Azores, Madeira, 
and the Canary Islands; and 3) continental EU islands. The cohesion policies insert the 
latter among the “regions with handicaps.” According to the European Union, “territo-
rial cohesion is about ensuring the harmonious development of all the European places 
and about making sure that their citizens are able to make the most of inherent features 
of theses territories.”31
As affirmed in the preamble to Regulation 1080/2006, the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund contributes to reducing the development gap by taking provisions for 
rural and urban areas, declining industrial regions, areas with a geographical or natural 
handicap, such as islands, mountainous areas, sparsely populated areas, and border re-
gions.32 Regulation 1698/2005, which supports rural development through the Euro-
pean Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), states that special provisions 
should apply “to mitigate the specific constraints and structural problems in farming and 
forestry activities and in adding value to agricultural and forestry products as a result of 
remoteness, insularity or distant location and of the dependency of the rural economy on 
a limited number of agricultural products, and to promote a robust rural development 
policy (Article 60).”33
As Moncada, Camilleri, Formosa, and Galea have pointed out, “the European approach 
to islands may be characterised as incremental rather than comprehensive, and fragment-
ed across a number of policy areas.”34 Almost all European island regions possess a legal 
status that recognizes their specificity. Today, island regions operate within the European 
geo-strategic context; decisions that affect them in many different ways are made not by 
their nation-state of belonging, but in Brussels.
The attention paid to island environments by community policies therefore embeds is-
lands in a new context that to a certain extent seems to contradict their earlier “national” 
definition: “from being appendages of the states, they have become the periphery of a 
continent.”35 Whereas islands previously had to negotiate exclusively with a national 
power, they now have to deal with a supranational structure within which the political 
relationships and rules are different, or are yet to be established. While certain island 
environments in the Baltic Sea Region such as the Åland Islands were able to profit from 
their special status and obtain derogating provisions at the time of Finland’s Accession 
Treaty, it was not possible for others to do the same. Brussels waived the provisions 
passed in this regard in the summer of 1999 with reference to the Member States of the 
European Union, and granted the Åland Islands the right to continue duty-free sales of 
1 ESPON, The Development of the Islands – European Islands, p. 6.
2 Moncada et al., Islands at the Periphery, p. 57.
 Ibid., 57.
4 Ibid., 58.
5 Hache, Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, p. 77.
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goods on the ships that connect the Archipelago to the mainland.36 It also granted an 
exception to the right of domicile (hembygdsrätt) 37 in effect on the Åland Islands that 
contravenes the fundamental principles of the Community’s legal system according to 
which any form of discrimination with regard to nationality or in the context of eco-
nomic freedom is prohibited.38
Between 1991 and 1999, the Commission passed 838 measures on the Mediterranean 
islands, 184 of which concerned Corsica, followed by Sicily.39 The EU island activism 
continued also in the new millennium. As André-Louis Sanguin has observed, the debates on 
European integration nevertheless reveal a bias in favour of the mainland. When island 
areas are considered, it is from a national or sector perspective that relates to issues such 
as fishing, transport, or the environment.40 References in community legislation to the 
islands of the Mediterranean area are dominated by agricultural questions, while in the 
Baltic Sea area the interest in fishing prevails.41 In all that the recognition of “insular-
ity” as the problem constitutes a conditio sine qua non for requesting the enactment of 
measures to serve the specific needs of island areas. No wonder, then, that also the repre-
sentatives of islands at the European Parliament conform to this thesis to enhance their 
bargaining power within the EU.
On 4 February 2016, Salvatore Cicu, the Sardinian MEP from the European People’s 
Party (EPP), put forward a resolution on the insularity of Sicily and Sardinia, earning the 
support of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the European 
Green Party (EGP), the Confederal Group of the European United Left / Nordic Green 
Left (GUE/NGL), and the Five Star Movement (M5S), which is part of the Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) parliamentary group. The resolution passed 
with 495 out of 693 votes in favour. The statement by Cicu after the vote was significant: 
“this is an historic vote for Sicily and Sardinia which for the first time finally sees the 
island issue represented at a European level. […] The disadvantaged conditions in the 
two regions have now become concrete facts that will translate into new resources, more 
6 G. Baldacchino and C. Pleijel, European Islands, Development and the Cohesion Policy: A Case Study of Kökar, 
Åland Islands, in: Island Studies Journal 5 (2010) 1, p. 91, http://www.islandstudies.ca/sites/islandstudies.ca/files/
ISJ-5-1-2010-Baldacchino+Pleijel_0.pdf (accessed 17 January 2017).
7 Possession of Ålandic regional citizenship confers voting rights and the right to sit in the Legislative Assembly, to 
own property, and to carry out a commercial activity. In order to acquire regional citizenship, it is necessary to be 
a Finnish citizen, to have lived on the Åland Islands for five years, and to demonstrate a satisfactory knowledge 
of Swedish. Article 40 of the law on autonomy also establishes that teaching in schools financed by government 
funds must be in Swedish. By using this Article, the Ålandic authorities have the right to prevent the use of any 
other language except Swedish. See S. Spiliopoulou Åkermark (ed.), The Right of Domicile on Åland. A report 
from the seminar The right of domicile, the right of trade, citizens’ rights – cornerstones of Åland’s autonomy 
held in Helsinki on 14 June 2007, Mariehamn 2009; D. Paci, L’arcipelago della pace. Le isole Åland e il Baltico (XIX-
XXI sec.), Milan 2016, pp. 19-197.
8 Hache, Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, p. 157.
9 J.-P. Pellegrinetti and A. Rovere, La Corse et la République. La vie politique de la fin du second Empire au début 
du XXIe siècle, Paris 2004, p. 64.
40 A.-L. Sanguin, Périphéricité et ultrapériphéricité insulaires dans l’Union européenne, in: L’Espace politique 2 
(2007) 2, p. 1, http://espacepolitique.revues.org/857 (accessed 17 January 2017)..
41 Hache, Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, p. 65.
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opportunities, and more rights. […] Thanks to this decision, which has been passed 
with a large majority, it will be easy to overcome the legislative obstacles created by 
the guarantees of the freedom of competition with a principle of territorial continuity: 
for example, the transport systems of Sicily and Sardinia will finally be entitled to the 
economic benefits that they require to cover a geographical gap without encountering 
EU bans.”42 Moreover, in consideration of this acknowledgement, Cicu demanded the 
creation of “a homogeneous group made up of all island territories,” the adoption of new 
statistical indicators in addition to GDP, and an accurate analysis of the additional costs 
borne by islands.43
Given that from a EU perspective the underdevelopment of islands is caused by geo-
graphical isolation, the ultimate resolution of their specific problems would be achieved 
by creating a “geographical continuity”44 that “bridges” the distance, both in a literal 
sense, through the implementation of infrastructure and metaphorically, through the 
provision of more funding. In an TV interview during the election campaign of February 
2008, the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi gave the following answer to a 
question by a journalist regarding his plans to build a bridge across the Straits of Messina: 
“I promise the Sicilian people that one of the first things that we will do when we return 
to government will be to begin the construction of the bridge across the Straits, which 
is the only major project able to make Sicily fully part of Italy, and Sicilians completely 
Italian.”45
By relying on the concept of “insularity” and its underlying geographical determinism, 
the European Union can present itself as a “charitable” institution ready to intervene 
with the provision of structural funds in order to satisfy the requests of their inhabit-
ants. In this way the structural funds fuel an insularist mentality, and the propensity of 
island residents to over-cultivate their insular specificities in order to confirm a particular 
cultural identity that legitimates their claims for specific benefits.46 However, in the ef-
fort of the construction of an insular identity a variable linked to the island imaginary 
comes into play that “does not determine, but contours and conditions physical and 
social events in distinct, and distinctly relevant, ways,” as Baldacchino explains.47 In 
other words, “islandness” rather than just “insularity” co-determines de facto the politi-
cal negotiation, whatever the prevalent rhetoric of this negotiation may consist of. The 
42 Ue, approvata la risoluzione Cicu sull‘insularità: “Un voto storico per Sardegna e Sicilia”, in: L’Unione Sarda.it 6 
February 2016, http://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/politica_italiana/2016/02/04/ue_passa_la_mozione_di_sal-
vatore_cicu_sull_insularit_un_voto_stor-1-465287.html (accessed 17 January 2017).
4 Ibid.
44 See A. Vieira, Il discorso dell’anti-insularità e il poio maderense come sua negazione, in: Diacronie. Studi di Storia 
Contemporanea 27 (2016) , pp. 6-7, http://www.studistorici.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/15_VIEIRA.pdf 
(accessed 17 January 2017).
45 Berlusconi promette il ponte sullo Stretto, 22 February 2008, http://www.lasiciliaweb.it/articolo/2122/italia/ (ac-
cessed 17 January 2017).
46 R. Brunet, R. Ferras and H. Théry (eds.), Les mots de la géographie. Dictionnaire critique, Paris 1992.
47 G. Baldacchino, The Coming of Age of Island Studies, in: Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 
95(2004) , p. 278.
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interplay between both dimensions can be observed also in the case of political network-
ing among Mediterranean and Baltic Sea islands.
2. Networking in the Mediterranean and Baltic Sea Islands
As already mentioned, the admission of regions to the Union’s multi-level governance 
framework, sanctioned by the creation of the Committee of Regions in 1994 and by the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, represented a turning point also for the island areas 
whose specific features were now officially recognized. Of course, this was the result of 
efforts with a longer history. During the first twenty years after the establishment of the 
European Community, Europe’s peripheral and ultra-peripheral islands remained in a 
kind of political and legal “no man’s land.”48 The European island environments began to se-
cure some political recognition since 1973, following the creation of the European Conference 
of Peripheral Maritime Regions in Saint-Malo that year. Today CPMR unites one hundred 
fifty-nine regions across twenty-nine countries to foster the development of Europe’s pe-
ripheral regions and represents their interests in the European arena.49 It is subdivided into 
six geographical committees: Atlantic Arc, Balkan and Black Sea, Islands, Inter-Mediterranean, 
Baltic Sea and North Sea.
The creation in 1980 of an Islands Commission within the context of CPMR put a new 
focus on the centre / periphery and mainland/island binomials. The Commission includes all 
the islands in Europe plus the Isle of Man, with the aim of refuting the idea that “island” 
must be a synonym of “isolation.” Since the 1990s it operates within an institutional 
context characterized by the principle of multilevel governance which provides for the 
sharing of decision-making among various institutional actors at different levels – local, 
national, and regional. The affirmation of this principle made it necessary to adopt a 
special legal framework for islands, which decided to group together and fight for their 
rights and their identity within the European Community, in order to emancipate them-
selves from their subordinate status in relation to the national mainland powers.50
The InterReg cross-border cooperation programmes are three: the first one between the 
South of Corsica and the North of Sardinia; the second one between the South of Cor-
sica and the North of Sardinia on the one hand, and between the North of Corsica and 
Tuscany on the other; the third one between Corsica, Tuscany, and Sardinia. They pursue 
the objective of integrating regions and making them reciprocally complementary in ac-
cordance with the principle expressed in the document entitled Europe 2000+. Cooperation 
for European Territorial Development. Based on this document, European policy must promote 
spatial, social, and economic cohesion at a regional level by taking actions to protect the most 
depressed areas. These actions relate to the protection of the environment and cultural herit-
48 Sanguin, Périphéricité et ultrapériphéricité insulaires, p. 15.
49 Y.-W. Chen, Transnational Cooperation of Ethnopolitical Mobilization: A Survey Analysis of European Ethnopoli-
tical Groups, New York 2009, p. 15.
50 Hache, Quel statut pour les Îles d’Europe?, pp. 29-79.
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age.51 The development plan for Corsica, which was adopted on 29 September 1983 by 
the Corsican Assembly, drew attention to the function of the island as a “natural bridge” 
between mainland Italy and Sardinia. The document included an invitation to the South 
of Corsica to create cultural and commercial links with Catalonia, the island of Majorca 
and the Arab world, the aim being that it should one day become a hub for the exchange 
and circulation of ideas and people in the western Mediterranean.52
On 17 November 1987, the Conference of Islands of the Peripheral Maritime Regions 
was created within the Strasbourg Parliament with the aim of promoting dialogue among 
groups with shared interests. Created on the initiative of the Vice-President of the Euro-
pean Democratic Group, the Corsican MEP François Musso, the Conference of Islands 
of the Peripheral Maritime Regions focuses on issues such as energy, taxation, and the 
environment.53 The objective was to obtain the same provisions of support and assist-
ance that certain ultra-peripheral islands, such as the Overseas Department, the Azores, 
Madeira, and the Canary Islands, enjoyed thanks to the POSEI programme.54 The the-
sis behind these initiatives was, once again, that all islands have fallen behind in their 
development due to their insular situation. With the usual accent laid on a supposed 
fragility caused by insularity as such, other specific programmes were implemented; the 
1995 Special Programme on Remoteness and Insularity for Corsica (POSEICOR) is one 
example.55
In a speech delivered in Ajaccio in 1989, the President of the European Commission, 
Jacques Delors, issued an invitation to “create a general contextualisation that would 
permit islands to overcome their natural handicaps.”56 In 1995, Lino Briguglio, Director 
of the Island and Small States Institute at the University of Malta, drew up a vulnerability 
index based on economic, physical, cultural, and human parameters associated with the 
fragility of islands. This index was adopted in its entirety by the Economic and Social 
Council of the Assembly-General of the United Nations.57 An official report based on 
that index was prepared for the session of 6 April 1998.58
It was in this framework that in the mid-1990s the islands of the Mediterranean and 
Baltic Sea areas began to formulate new cooperation strategies in order to attain a more 
central position within the new geopolitical scenarios created after the end of the bipolar 
world and the acceleration of the European integration and enlargement process. They 
51 S. Dühr, C. Colomb and V. Nadin, European Spatial Planning and Territorial Cooperation, London 2010, pp. 201-
202.
52 C. Olivesi, La Corse et la construction européenne, in: Annuaire des collectivités locales 15 (1995) 1, p. 55, http://




56 Sanguin, Périphéricité et ultrapériphéricité insulaires, p. 15.
57 L. Briguglio, Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities, in: World Development 2 (1995) 
9, pp. 1615-162, https://secure.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/147257/SIDS_and_their_ecn_vulne-
rability_Index.pdf (accessed 17 January 2017). 
58 United Nations General Assembly, Development of a vulnerability index for small island developing States, Re-
port of the Secretary-General, 6 February 1998, http://islands.unep.ch/d98-vul.htm (accessed 17 January 2017).
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underlined that in view of the increasing role of the maritime spaces it was important 
to bring islands together to address common concerns and challenges. In analogy to the 
insularity/islandness theoretical divide, from an analytical viewpoint we can interpret 
this type of argumentation as an example for the social and symbolic practices developed 
in relation to the sea which have been delineated by the Brazilian anthropologist Manuel 
Diegues.59 Here the accent is on the sea space as a connecting medium, whereas the 
insularity-related paradigm points out the “objective” problems created by the physical 
presence of water around islands. Island networks can be seen as a synergetic fund raising 
effort of a sum of “disadvantaged” territories, or as a synergy effort of populations that 
practically redefines the maritime space they inhabit, placing their islands at its centre.
The end of the Cold War divisions brought new opportunities for cooperation among 
the islands of the Baltic Sea Region. The idea of regional cooperation attracted a number 
of different political, social, and economic actors. The demise of communism provoked 
a redefinition and rewriting of the narratives associated with the Baltic Sea Region. The 
establishment of contacts with countries formerly belonging to the communist bloc, 
and their future integration, was presented as a historical necessity.60 In the process of 
regional integration, region-building narratives of the past sought to overcome the im-
age of the Baltic Sea as an area conflict, proposing instead cooperation as the common 
denominator of regional identity.61 No wonder, then, that also the idea of networks was 
proposed as a characteristic feature of the Baltic Sea area’s past and future, and that the 
enhancement of island was put on the political agenda. Since 1989, the seven largest 
islands, that is, Gotland, Öland, Åland, Hiiumaa, Saaremaa, Rügen, and Bornholm, 
collaborated on issues of common interest creating the B7 Baltic Seven Islands Network, 
which Bornholm and Öland however decided to leave in 2014, since they did not see the 
benefits of their inclusion now that according to one of the B7 founders and prominent 
personalities of Öland, Jörgen Samuelsson, the EU’s interest in cooperation in the Baltic 
had faded in favour of North-South and East-West cooperation.62
Samuelsson’s critique indicates that the local elites of the Baltic Sea islands expect that 
the islands’ specific problems can be resolved mainly through an island-centred approach 
and a more autonomously acting intra-island cooperation, a view that comes close to 
the proposals developed by academic island studies. The B7 organization states that its 
cooperation “has contributed to putting the islands more in control of their own destiny. 
Through an exchange of experience, lobbying, and projects, B7 cooperation has helped 
59 A. C. Diegues, Ilhas e mares: simbolismo e imaginario, São Paulo 1998, p. 259. See also M. Grzechnik and H. 
Hurskainen (eds.), Beyond the sea. Reviewing the manifold dimensions of water as barrier and bridge, Vienna 
2015.
60 See N. Götz (ed.), The Sea of Identities. A Century of Baltic and East European Experiences with Nationality, Class 
and Gender, Huddinge 2014; N. Götz. Spatial Politics & Fuzzy Regionalism. The case of the Baltic Sea area, in: 
Baltic Worlds 9 (2016) -4, pp. 55-67.
61 See M. Grzechnik, Making Use of the Past: The Role of Historians in Baltic Sea Region Building, in: Journal of Baltic 
Studies 4 (2012) , pp. 29-4.
62 M. Ståhl, Öland lämnar B7-samarbetet, in: Ölandsbladet 16 December 2014, http://www.olandsbladet.se/ettan/
oland-lamnar-b7-samarbetet/ (accessed 5 February 2017).
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make the islands more resilient and their populations richer, smarter, and happier.”63 It 
is true that the cooperation in the Baltic Sea region was a way to reposition the North 
of the Western European countries after the Cold War, and that island networks fitted 
with this objective of continental actors. What matters to the B7 islanders, however, is to 
perceive themselves as members of a group and to achieve the external recognition of the 
group’s existence. These aspects have become crucial for the development of a collective 
island identity. 
In regard to the Mediterranean islands, it is worth looking at IMEDOC, a network that 
since 1995 has united the western Mediterranean islands (the Balearic Islands, Corsica, 
Sardinia, and Sicily) in order to create a “shared mouthpiece for the islands of the Medi-
terranean.”64 IMEDOC’s main goals are to promote shared interests by ensuring that 
their status as islands is recognised at the European level; to share experiences among 
regional administrations; to carry out coordinated activities undertaken by the political 
and economic actors; to encourage economic, social, and cultural cooperation among 
islands aimed at the defence of their special island status; and to support projects in a 
variety of spheres, such as transport and communication, infrastructure, tourism, en-
vironment, fishing, and business development.65 IMEDOC’s objective is therefore to 
create “an area of stable cooperation for the exchange of experiences and the promotion 
of their shared interests in the European Union,”66 so as to draw the European Union’s 
attention to the needs of island environments in the hope that the island dimension is 
present in Community policies. As Farhad Daftary has pointed out, the network has 
attempted to lobby the European Union to attend to the critical situation in Europe’s 
Mediterranean islands, seeking EU structural funds to facilitate the development of pe-
ripheral regions.67
In 2010 within the framework of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation 
(EGTC) another network of the “Mediterranean Archipelago” was established, the ac-
ronym of which is ARCHIMED. It was founded by the governments of the Balearic 
Islands, the Region of Sicily, the District of Larnaca, while Crete joined it later. The aims 
of this partnership differ little from those of IMEDOC. Notwithstanding the late lip 
services paid to the “archipelago” concept, the overall route taken by IMEDOC reveals a 
tendency of the Mediterranean islands’ local elites to plainly adapt to the EU’s “insular-
ity” paradigm, differently from their northern peers. As the resolution presented by MEP 
Cicu shows, their chief concern remains to receive assistance by the continental centre. 
The frequent underlining of their islands’ “mediterraneaness” is functional to that effort, 
6 B7 Baltic Islands, B7 Info, http://www.b7.org/ (accessed 17 January 2017); see also B7 Baltic Islands, B7 25. 25 
years of the B7 Baltic Islands Network, 2014, https://issuu.com/pelagis/docs/b7-25_brochure_pages (accessed 
17 January 2017).
64 Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière, Imedoc, http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org/en/resources/pro-
jects/projects/project/show/imedoc/ (accessed 17 January 2017).
65 Ibid.
66 Olivesi, La Corse et la construction européenne, p. 55.
67 F. Daftary, Experimenting with Territorial Administrative Autonomy in Corsica: Exception or Pilot Region, in: Inter-
national Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15 (2008) 2, pp. 27-12.
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as it suggests that “aid from Brussels” is a fair reparation for the disadvantages suffered 
from the economic and political hegemony of Protestant northern European countries.
3. Archipelagos in a sea of problems
The concept of “archipelago” introduces an aspect that the EU policies seem to have 
underestimate for a long time. The words “isolation” and “insular” derive from the Latin 
word for island, insula, whereas the Greek word “for island is nissos or nesos, etymologi-
cally rooted in *nau-, meaning ship, and related to navigation of vehicles.”68 One may 
say that the insularity concept prevailing in EU policies preferred the Latin meaning 
over the Greek one. This is not just an academic question without practical relevance. 
In fact, it is in the practical dimension that all islands prove to be both, isolated insula 
and connected nesos. In the Mediterranean, the recent humanitarian emergency caused 
by waves of mass immigration has revealed how mistaken it is to treat islands only as 
isolated spaces.
Under the impact of geopolitical tensions and dramatic migration movements, the 
Mediterranean mare nostrum turned out to be perceived as a mare aliorum.69 Also the 
islands in the Mediterranean have became “fortresses” unprepared to cope with the flow 
of migrants. They are located along migratory routes that are fluid and continuously 
recomposed by specific events, such as wars or agreements between countries regarding 
migration controls. According to Nathalie Bernardie-Tahir and Camille Schmoll, the 
islands are therefore at the centre of a media-driven social construction of an immigra-
tion imaginary that emphasises the aspects of the humanitarian crises. The same media 
delineate new “geographies of fear” in the European public opinion.70 Islands, which 
are a perfect “geographical laboratory,” take on the appearance of places where frontier 
impacts are crystallized. They fall within the complex dynamics of the “teichopolitique”71 
– a neologism coined by Florine Ballif and Stéphane Rosière to denote space control 
policies originating from the idea that the construction of barriers is sufficient to counter 
the undesired effects of “liquid modernity.”72 Europe represents a dual division between 
the territories located on the periphery of the Schengen area – that is, the Mediterranean 
68 E. Clark and L. Clark, Isolating connections –connecting isolations, in: Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Ge-
ography 91 (2009) 4, p. 15, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0467.2009.0024.x/pdf (accessed 
17 January 2017).
69 C. Fogu, From Mare Nostrum to Mare Aliorum: Mediterranean Theory and Mediterraneism in Contemporary 
Italian Thought, in: California ltalian Studies Journal 1 (2010) 1, pp. 1-2.
70 N. Bernardie-Tahir and C. Schmoll, Iles, frontières et migrations méditerranéennes: Lampedusa et les autres, in: 
L’Espace politique 25 (2015) 1, p. 4, https://espacepolitique.revues.org/ (accessed 17 January 2017).
71 F. Ballif and S. Rosière, Le défi des «teichopolitiques». Analyser la fermeture contemporaine des territoires, in: 
L’Espace géographique 8 (2009) , pp. 19-206, https://www.cairn.info/revue-espace-geographique-2009--
page-19.htm (accessed 17 January 2017).
72 Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge 2000.
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islands, which perform the function of “guards and prisons,”73 and the territories in 
which migrants aspire to settle.74
As Paolo Cuttitta has shown, the island of Lampedusa has come to be seen in Europe as 
the perfect symbol of the Euro-Mediterranean border; after 2011, with the Arab Spring, 
the Sicilian island has become also an open-air prison.75 The “frontierization” process 
means that islands such as Lampedusa and Lesbos form the stage on which the “society 
of the spectacle”76 mounts its “border show” on mass invasion, hospitality, rejection, 
and humanitarian emergency. The political and media discourse depicts a permanent 
state of emergency that generates feelings of solidarity with the island’s population. On 
5 July 2004 the then President of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, awarded the towns and 
ports of Lampedusa and Linosa a gold medal for civil merits for the humanity shown in 
coping with the emergency. The then President of the Region of Sicily, Salvatore Cuf-
faro, stressed “the example of the civility of the Sicilians.”77 Lesbos and Lampedusa were 
recently proposed for the Nobel Peace prize.78 In a world characterized by what Manuel 
Castells calls ‘‘the information age’’ and ‘‘the network society,’’79 islands have become es-
sential components of the “world archipelago”80 suggested by Christian Depraetere. 
4. Conclusions
As we have seen, the EU’s growing attention towards island areas coincided with the shift 
of island studies from a “continental” view to the full appreciation of island centrality. 
However, this coincidence remained only chronological. While the EU policies led to 
an increasing mobilization of resources, they remained tightly linked to the insularity 
paradigm. According to the emerging discipline of island studies, the isolation felt by 
islanders is not due to the physical separation from a mainland as such, but to the per-
ception of their concrete living conditions as disadvantageous due to a more complex 
entanglement. Although the EU policies evolved from the earlier view on islands as 
mere territorial appendixes of national territories that were handicapped by their physi-
cal separation, to a supranational view that mobilizes the island worlds in the effort of 
interregional integration and region building, the connectivity of islands appears to be 
constantly underestimated, both as a potential for the development of more seaward and 
7 L. Lemaire, Islands and a carceral environment. Maltese policy in terms of irregular migration, in: Journal of 
Immigrant and Refugee Studies 12 (2014) 2, pp.14-160.
74 Bernardie-Tahir and Schmoll, Iles, frontières et migrations méditerranéennes, p. 7.
75 P. Cuttitta, Lo spettacolo del confine: Lampedusa tra produzione e messa in scena della frontiera, Milan 2012.
76 G. Debord, The society of the spectacle, New York 1995.
77 Immigrazione. Cuffaro: “Dal popolo siciliano esempio di civiltà”, 5 July 2004, http://www.regione.sicilia.it/presi-
denza/UfficioStampa/2004/luglio/riconoscimentoimmigrazione.htm (accessed 17 January 2017).
78 F. Gatti, Nobel per la Pace a Lampedusa e Lesbo: perché l’appello di Rosi va sostenuto, in: L’Espresso 22 February 
2016, http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2016/02/22/news/premio-nobel-agli-abitanti-di-lampedusa-l-ap-
pello-di-rosi-e-l-espresso-1.25140 (accessed 17 January 2017).
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outward looking economic and cultural initiatives and for the prevention of tensions and 
crises that manifest themselves on the islands not because of their isolation, but because 
of their connectedness.
As long as the island networks are not fully recognized as “archipelagos” that possess their 
own endogenous synergies, but continue to be seen as a sum of problematic “insulari-
ties” that merit charitable help from the centre, their potential of synergetic development 
will hardly be fully exploited. Especially in the Mediterranean both European and local 
decision makers abstain so far from adopting a more island-centred and connectivity-ori-
ented approach that would improve the obsolete internal infrastructures of great islands 
such as Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, incentivize intra-islands transport and communi-
cation networks, and foster common marketing initiatives in tourism, wine and food 
production under a “Mediterranean Islands” brand, and so on. But as long as the term 
“insularity” recurs in official documents and the eligibility of islands for funding hinges 
on the assumption that their physical condition is responsible for their delay in socio-
economic development, especially in the Mediterranean the islanders and their repre-
sentatives all-to-easily adjust to the EU terminology, and probably also to the related way 
of thinking and behaving. The same can be said of the “predictable surprise” regarding 
the migration crisis. Here, again, it should have been considered long ago that a sea not 
only separates islands from the mainland, but also connects them to realities inside and 
outside national and continental borders. A major awareness that these borders remain 
physically and conceptually fluid, and require permanent negotiation and legitimisation, 
could help a better handling and prevention of crises.
